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Abstract 
This study explores current processes of state formation in the Pacific islands, focusing on 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Bougainville (as an autonomous region of Papua New 
Guinea), Southern Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea, and East Timor. It challenges the 
mainstream discourse on fragile states as a framework for analysis of the situation of any of these 
countries or regions, and argues that it is more appropriate to talk about states emerging from 
hybrid political orders as a common denominator. Hybrid political orders combine elements of 
the introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous 
traditions. In East Timor and the Pacific island countries customary governance, deeply rooted in 
locality, has significant implications for state capacity and functionality as well as legitimacy. 
Tonga with its constitutional monarchy is transitioning to more liberal democratic forms of 
governance. This gradual process is driven by civil society forces that are growing in strength. In 
the Melanesian cases of Vanuatu, Bougainville and Solomon Islands there is negotiation of the 
conditions and possibilities of a ‘marriage’ between customary governance and introduced 
Western forms of governance, based on relatively strong customary spheres and state institutions 
that struggle with problems of effectiveness and legitimacy. East Timor is engaged in a 
conventional state-building process (with massive external assistance) focusing on the transfer 
and strengthening of central government institutions. The process has taken little account of 
customary institutions and their potential for contributing to governance and order, and has 
inadvertently marginalised both local culture and rural communities more generally, with 
considerable negative effects for Timorese state formation. In the Southern Highlands Province 
of PNG a vacuum of effective and legitimate governance can be found. 
In all of these countries or regions there is considerable potential for state and non-state actors to 
play complementary roles in the provision of functions which OECD countries normally assign 
exclusively to the state. We also found areas of incompatibility and areas of considerable friction 
between state and customary institutions. These, however, are not due to insurmountable 
contradictions between customary and liberal democratic principles and could be overcome by 
processes of mutual adaptation. 
These findings—large areas of complementarity, at times intense, but surmountable 
incompatibilities—augur well for constructive interaction between state and customary 
institutions which might lead to the emergence of networks of resilient governance which are not 
introduced from the outside, but are embedded in the societal structures on the ground. 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past few years, OECD members 
have seen ‘fragile states’ as one of the, if 
not the sole, major challenge to sustainable 
development and security. State fragility is 
associated with an incapacity to deal with 
violent conflict (or even the source of such 
conflict) and an inability to provide basic 
protection to citizens. It has adverse 
consequences for citizens, communities 
and neighbouring states. Fragile states 
have been identified by the international 
community as a significant source of 
regional and global insecurity. At the same 
time, such states do not create congenial 
conditions for development. In terms of the 
development and peacebuilding/security 
agenda therefore, fragile states are seen as 
contributors to internal and international 
instability as well as underdevelopment.  
Accordingly, the issue of fragile states and 
their replacement with effective, resilient 
and legitimate state institutions figures 
prominently in Australia’s development, 
defence and foreign policy agendas. The 
past Liberal-National Government and the 
current Labor Government have made 
commitments to prevent violent conflict, 
guard against state failure, and focus on 
state-building and peacebuilding, 
especially in the South East Asian and 
South Pacific regions. Sustainable 
development, national and regional 
security and viable nation states in 
Australia’s sphere of direct interest are a 
major issue within Australia’s foreign 
policy and Overseas Development 
Assistance policies.    
It is against this background that the 
Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Studies (ACPACS) was commissioned by 
AusAID’s Fragile States Unit (FSU) to 
provide new perspectives on the issue of 
fragile states and state-building, 
particularly in the South Pacific.
1
 
ACPACS had already questioned certain 
aspects of the fragile states discourse on 
the basis of work in Bougainville, 
Vanuatu, East Timor and the Solomon 
Islands (Boege 2007; Brown 2007; 
Clements et al. 2007). Building on our 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on research in the context of an 
AusAID-funded project ‘Towards Effective and 
Legitimate Governance: States Emerging from 
Hybrid Political Orders’ which was conducted by 
ACPACS research staff during June 2007 to April 
2008. The paper is the revised version of the project’s 
overview report. ACPACS gratefully acknowledges 
the support provided by AusAID for this project. 
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research and practice experiences in these 
countries we posited that widening the 
perspective and changing the focus can 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
issues at stake and, on this basis, new 
evidence-based policy approaches might 
be developed that would address persistent 
problems. The evidence strongly suggests 
that focusing on the problems alone (real 
though they are) without also taking into 
account the indigenous strengths of the 
societies in question, generates a distorted 
perspective on both the state and the 
communities. By reframing the problem in 
terms of community strengths and 
resilience we can better focus on some of 
the indigenous sources of state capability, 
effectiveness and what we call “grounded 
legitimacy”. FSU invited ACPACS to 
investigate this alternative approach 
through comparative research in several 
Pacific island countries or regions, namely 
Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Bougainville 
(as an autonomous region of Papua New 
Guinea), Solomon Islands, Tonga and also 
East Timor. This paper summarises the key 
findings and conclusions from this 
comparative research. 
2. The conceptual and 
methodological approach 
The starting point of this research project 
was a critique of the narrowness of the 
current political and scholarly debate about 
state fragility and state-building (Clements 
et al 2007).  
The modern Western-style Weberian state 
hardly exists outside the OECD. Many 
states in the ‘rest’ of the world are political 
entities that do not resemble that model 
state.
2
 Contemporary mainstream ‘state 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, ‘stateless’ regions can be found even 
in OECD states. Dillon and Westbury make the point 
that remote indigenous Australia is characterised by 
talk’ in the context of the fragile states and 
state-building discourse—which might be 
better interpreted as a discourse of political 
science and policies of the developed 
OECD world—routinely refers to the 
‘classical’ model of the Western Weberian 
sovereign state, and other states are 
presented as deviant cases, with evaluation 
of the degree to which existing states 
approximate the pre-existing (Weberian) 
benchmarks (Hameiri 2007: 138). 
Promoting the liberal state as the ultimate 
model, however, is to ignore the historical 
context, which is the rather recent 
historical emergence of the modern states, 
in particular in the post-colonial 
developing world. 
Whereas the processes of state-building in 
Europe and the Western world took 
centuries, the western state forms were 
‘delivered’ like products to many parts of 
the Global South in a relatively short time 
span during the era of colonisation and 
decolonisation. In the decades following 
the Second World War a host of 
independent ‘nation states’ came into 
being in the formerly colonised parts of the 
world, driven to a significant extent by the 
exhaustion of colonial powers and the 
specific international post-war dynamics. 
Both the political elites of the new states 
and the international (state) community at 
large welcomed newly achieved statehood, 
often confusing the formal declaration of 
independence with the formation of a state, 
unaware of the myriad of obstacles to the 
                                                                          
“a governance vacuum” (Dillon and Westbury 2007: 
43), with the “vast bulk of smaller remote settlements 
(…) not included in any formal local government 
system” and government officers such as police, 
nurses and teachers hardly present (ibid.: 44), and 
they conclude that the “lack of government 
engagement in remote Australia might legitimately be 
conceptualised as akin to a ‘failed state’” (ibid.: 47) 
as “remote Indigenous Australia meets many of the 
accepted criteria for a weak state” (ibid.: 45). 
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latter. In many cases, at the time of 
independence the state was nothing more 
than an empty shell. Critically, in many of 
the newly independent states there was no 
history of pre-colonial unitary rule and 
people did not have a tradition of national 
identification; only a few of these states 
shared one common language and one 
common culture. Many peoples had no 
lived experience of statehood, not to speak 
of nationhood or citizenship, so this 
resulted in “states without nations” 
(Dinnen 2007: 259). There was generally 
little preparation for statehood, not only in 
terms of institutions of government, but 
even more so in terms of the socio-
economic capacities that underpin the 
services that make up the functions of the 
state and also in terms of the formation of 
an identity of citizenship among the people 
who were to form the ‘citizenry’ and the 
public ‘servants’ of the state.
3
 
Attempts to consolidate the introduced 
form of statehood after it had been 
formally established were often 
unsuccessful, and the attempts to impose 
this new form of political order came at 
considerable costs (as had been the case 
with state formation in Europe before).  
In other words, the new states lacked roots in 
the recipient societies. The global delivery of 
Weberian state institutions was not 
                                                 
3 Fukuyama makes the point that the Weberian state 
had “historical precedents in Asian societies and was 
therefore much less susceptible to capture or 
undermining by neopatrimonialism or clientelism” 
(Fukuyama 2002: 30), and Wesley-Smith posits that  
“in general, those places with hierarchical traditional 
political systems, a history of centralized forms of 
organization, and culturally homogenous populations 
have fared better than places where other 
characteristics prevail” (Wesley-Smith 2006: 123). In 
other words, the pre-colonial history of the regions 
that were to become independent states had an 
important impact on success or failure of state 
formation. 
accompanied by the development of the 
economic, political, social and cultural 
structures, and capacities that in the course of 
the evolution of the state in European history 
provided the basis and framework for an 
efficiently functioning political order. This 
also holds true for the development of a 
committed citizenry with a sense of 
citizenship, expectations towards the state, 
ownership of state affairs and a national 
identity. An identity as ‘citizens’ and the 
‘idea of the state’ does not meet with much 
cultural resonance within these societies, as 
people are relatively disconnected from the 
state, neither expecting too much from state 
institutions nor willing to fulfill obligations 
towards the state. This is because people 
identify themselves more as members of 
traditional non-state societal entities—such 
as clans or tribes—than as citizens of the 
state. 
Post-colonial state-building often resulted in 
the formation of ‘quasi-states’ (Jackson 
1990). These states benefited from juridical 
statehood as they were recognised as 
independent states in the international realm, 
with the principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity guaranteeing their 
existence as members of the international 
state system. These de jure states existed 
because they were recognised by other 
members of the international state 
community as ‘one of their own’, and they 
enjoyed international legal sovereignty 
(Krasner 2004). At the same time, however, 
they lacked domestic empirical statehood (or 
domestic sovereignty, authority (Krasner 
2004)). They were not locally rooted at 
home and not capable of effectively 
controlling their territory and their people. 
Jackson contrasts de jure states to de facto 
states which are embedded in society and 
can rely on a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence, and can control territory and 
people. Insofar as they are also recognised 
by the international state community, they 
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are both de facto and de jure. “In other 
words, this is the modern state in all its 
legal-rational Weberian splendour. This is 
the model the international community tries 
to replicate in collapsed states” (Ottaway 
2003: 247). This model Weberian state with 
its combination of empirical and juridical 
statehood, however, is far removed from the 
realities on the ground in many regions of 
Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. 
Rather, there is “a glaring gap between de 
jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty” 
(Ghani, Lockhart, Carnahan 2005: 1).
4
 States 
are ‘weak’ with regard to their 
implementation and enforcement capacities 
and with regard to their legitimacy. Today 
many state institutions sit uncomfortably 
within recipient societies. 
This ‘state of the state’ in many regions of 
the Global South calls for a change of 
perspective on the realities of political order 
in those regions.  
For a start, it has to be acknowledged that to 
speak of ‘weak’ states implies that there are 
other actors on the stage that are strong in 
relation to the state. ‘The state’ is only one 
actor among others, the state order is only 
one of a number of orders claiming to 
provide security, frameworks for conflict 
regulation and public goods. In particular, 
neither colonial rulers nor post-colonial 
governments were capable of establishing a 
legitimate state monopoly of violence in the 
territories that were to become ‘nation 
states’. 
Although state institutions claim authority 
within the boundaries of a given ‘state 
territory’, only outposts of ‘the state’ can be 
found in large parts of that territory, in a 
societal environment that is to a large extent 
                                                 
4 Ghani and colleagues call this the “sovereignty 
gap”, and they see building effective and capable 
states as the means “to close the sovereignty gaps” 
(Ghani, Lockhart, Carnahan 2005: 1).  
‘stateless’. The state has not yet permeated 
society and extended its effective control to 
the whole of society. Statelessness, however, 
does not mean Hobbesian anarchy; neither 
does it imply the complete absence of 
institutions. Rather, non-state customary 
institutions of governance that had existed 
prior to the era of colonial rule have survived 
the onslaught of colonialism and ‘national 
liberation’ in many places. They have, of 
course, been subject to considerable change 
and had to adapt to new circumstances, yet 
they have shown remarkable resilience. 
Customary law and indigenous knowledge 
as well as traditional societal structures—
extended families, clans, tribes, religious 
brotherhoods, village communities—and 
traditional authorities such as village elders, 
headmen, clan chiefs, healers, big men, 
religious leaders, etc. determine the 
everyday social reality of large parts of the 
population in developing countries even 
today, particularly in rural and remote 
peripheral areas. On many occasions, 
therefore, the only way to make state 
institutions work is through the utilisation of 
kin-based and other traditional networks. 
At the same time however, the state’s 
‘outposts’ are mediated by ‘informal’ 
indigenous societal institutions that 
implement their own logic and their own 
rules within the (incomplete) state structures. 
That is, the state’s ‘outposts’ are to a certain 
extent ‘infiltrated’ by ‘informal’ indigenous 
societal institutions and social forces that 
work according to their own logics and rules 
within the (incomplete) state structures. This 
leads to the deviation of state institutions 
from the ideal type of ‘proper’ state 
institutions. Those institutions are captured 
by social forces that make use of them not in 
the interest of the state and its citizenry, but 
in the interest of traditional, mostly kinship-
based, entities. State institutions—not only 
at the periphery, but also in the very centre 
of the state—become the subject of power 
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struggles between competing social groups 
and their leaders and are utilised by those 
groups and leaders for their own benefit, 
regardless of the needs of the “nation” or the 
“citizenry”. In a way, the whole debate about 
neopatrimonialism, clientelistic networks 
and patronage, for example in postcolonial 
African states, revolve around this 
usurpation of imported formal governance 
structures by indigenous informal societal 
forces.
5
 
On the other hand, the intrusion of state 
agencies impacts on non-state local orders as 
well. Customary systems of order are 
subjected to deconstruction and re-formation 
as they are incorporated into central state 
structures and processes. Customary 
institutions and customary authorities do not 
remain unchanged; they are influenced by 
the mechanisms of the state apparatus. They 
adopt an ambiguous position with regard to 
the state, appropriating state functions and 
‘state talk’, but at the same time pursuing 
their own agenda under the guise of the state 
authority and power. Taking state functions 
and state talk on board, however, also means 
to change one’s original stance. Some 
governments also try to deliberately borrow 
from and officially incorporate traditional 
authorities into the formal structures of the 
state in order to strengthen state capacities 
and legitimacy. 
The processes of mutual permeation that 
have been briefly sketched here, lead to 
contradictory and dialectic forms of socio-
political organisation that have their roots in 
both non-state indigenous societal structures 
and introduced state structures.  
This complex nature of governance is further 
complicated by the emergence and growing 
importance of institutions, movements and 
                                                 
5 For an overview of the discourse on 
neopatrimonialism see Engel and Erdmann 2007. 
formations that have their origins in 
economic and political globalisation. Where 
state agencies are incapable or unwilling to 
deliver security and other basic services, 
people will turn to other social entities for 
support. In this situation, the actors 
perceived as powerful and effective can 
include warlords and their militias in 
outlying regions, gang leaders in townships 
and squatter settlements, vigilante-type 
organisations, ethnically based protection 
rackets, millenarian religious movements, 
transnational networks of extended family 
relations, organised crime or new forms of 
tribalism. The emergence of these new 
forces is a consequence of poor state 
performance, and their activities can 
contribute to the further weakening of state 
structures. 
Overall then, the conventional Western 
perception which equates an absence of 
state-induced order to a complete absence of 
order is not a complete picture. Regions of 
so-called fragile statehood are generally 
places in which diverse and competing 
claims to power and logics of order and 
behaviour co-exist, overlap and intertwine: 
the logic of the ‘formal’ state, the logic of 
traditional ‘informal’ societal order, and the 
logic of globalisation and associated societal 
fragmentation (in various forms: ethnic, 
tribal, religious…) with its abundance of 
highly diverse actors.  
Hybrid political orders as domains of 
contrasting patterns of power and authority 
combine elements of the western model and 
elements stemming from the local pre-
colonial autoecephalous traditions of 
governance and politics; governance is 
carried out by an ensemble of local, national 
and also often international actors and 
agencies.  In this environment, state 
institutions are dependent on the other actors 
- and at the same time restricted by them. 
The ‘state’ has no privileged position as the 
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political framework that provides security, 
welfare and representation. 
Hybrid political orders nevertheless can also 
be perceived as, or can become ‘emerging 
states’. An analysis of the realities of the 
political orders on the ground has to address 
not only state institutions and their 
effectiveness but also the operation and 
effectiveness of non-state institutions from 
the customary as well as the civil society 
realms.  In addition, the nature and quality of 
the interaction between these different 
spheres is important to the stability and 
effectiveness of the state. 
Taking these conceptual considerations as 
a starting point, our research was guided 
by the following schema: 
 Weberian state 
- legal 
bureaucracy 
- welfare, health, 
education,  
- representative 
institutions 
- statutory law 
- individual land 
titles system 
- market / 
subsistence 
economy 
Privatisation of 
violence 
Low / Ineffective / 
illegitimate use 
of state coercion 
Fragile governance / Violent conflict 
Effective Governance / Social Peace 
Diversified  
control of  
violence 
Low social 
resilience 
High state coercion / 
Legitimate order 
High social resilience 
Customary order 
- customary 
institutions, 
- traditional leadership 
- kin-based social 
organisation, 
- customary law, 
- communal land 
tenure,  
- subsistence economy 
TYPE OF  GOVERNANCE 
G
O
V
E
R
N
A
N
C
E
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
IV
E
N
E
S
S
 O
F
 
State 
monopoly of 
violence 
Traditional 
peacemaking 
and control of 
violence  
Poverty, marginalization, unmet needs, corruption 
Privatisation of 
violence and 
payback 
cycles 
Friction / incompatibility / non-cooperative / confrontation  
Payback cycles 
of violence 
Hybrid political order: 
- partial customary 
institutions 
- partial state institutions 
- civil society 
- legal pluralism 
- mixed land tenure 
- subsistence / market  
Positive mutual accommodation / complementarity 
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This schema is a hypothetical representation 
of the factors that enhance or impede 
functioning, effective and legitimate political 
order. It is important to note that the schema 
is an heuristic device and should not be 
reified.  
The schema sets out the ideal types of three 
forms of political order and governance, 
namely the ideal type of the Weberian state 
on the one pole and the ideal type of non-
state customary order on the other pole, with 
hybrid political order situated in between the 
two. Western OECD states come closest to 
the Weberian state in reality, while 
traditional Melanesian and Polynesian 
societies were forms of customary order (this 
type of political order is rarely practiced in 
contemporary existing polities). In the 
Pacific region as well as in other parts of the 
Global South, the hybrid type of political 
order dominates. 
The three types can vary in the effectiveness 
of governance; all three types can provide 
pathways to functioning, effective and 
legitimate governance and hence social 
peace, and all three types are susceptible to 
fragility or even collapse and violent 
conflict. Hybrid political orders, however, 
seem to be particularly vulnerable as they 
are faced with the challenge of connecting 
different types of governance systems.  
Hybrid political orders prevail in the Pacific 
region, where governance is a complex mix 
of liberal institutional and customary 
mechanisms. Without wishing to idealise 
custom, we discovered that there may be 
models of governance which draw on the 
strengths of social order and resilience 
embedded in the community life of societies 
in the Pacific.  
Reconceptualising so-called fragile states as 
hybrid political orders enables us to identify 
and support processes of positive mutual 
accommodation between modern state 
institutions, customary local institutions and 
civil society institutions which might lead to 
the emergence of new forms of sustainable 
statehood. 
This novel approach to fragile states issues 
has been explored by means of 
comparative research in Vanuatu, Southern 
Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea, 
Bougainville (as an autonomous region 
within Papua New Guinea), Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and East Timor. Research 
focused on thematic areas that are crucial 
for the fragility or stability of political 
order, namely:  
1. Political Economy; 
2. Order and security; 
3. Social needs and service delivery; 
4. Law and justice; 
5. Leadership and representation; 
6. Participation and inclusion; 
7. Identities and citizenship. 
 
For each of these issue areas, the 
contributions and perceptions of the three 
sectors that represent (potential) sources of 
governance were analysed. These are:  
- the government, public service and 
political actors (the realm of the 
state institutions); 
- chiefs, elders, nobles, community 
leaders and other ‘informal’ actors 
(the realm of customary 
institutions); 
- churches, NGOs, business 
organisations, trade unions, donor 
agencies, womens’ groups, youth 
groups, community-based 
organisations (the realm of civil 
society). 
The contributions of the institutions of 
state, customary governance and civil 
society in the seven thematic areas listed 
above were assessed according to  
- capacity 
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- effectiveness and 
- legitimacy. 
Finally, the interactions between the three 
realms of state institutions, customary 
governance and civil society were 
discussed with regard to: 
1. Substitution: the identification of 
functional equivalents of the state 
outside state institutions; 
2. Complementarity: the identification 
of areas of overlap and (intentional or 
unintentional) cooperation of state, 
customary and civil society 
institutions; 
3. Incompatibility: the identification of 
customary approaches that conflict 
with state and/or civil society 
approaches. 
Assessing core state functions in light of 
the three dimensions of substitution, 
complementarity and incompatibility 
enables both a richer and a more realistic 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Pacific Island countries. It underpins a 
broader understanding of what a 
functioning and effective state might look 
like. 
3. State and society in the South 
Pacific: context, custom and 
globalization 
Indigenous forms of governance are 
important for the everyday life of the 
people in the Pacific islands countries. 
Where customary governance is strong, 
widely acknowledged by state authorities 
and firmly rooted in locality it may be able 
to generate “grounded legitimacy” for the 
state because of an organic connection to 
deep sources of cultural identity and 
stability. Where custom is contested or 
ignored by state authorities it is much more 
difficult for state systems to build 
“grounded legitimacy” and much more 
likely that they will be ineffectual. The 
stability or instability of the state, 
therefore, depends on how the state 
interacts with a wide variety of social and 
customary institutions. These relations are 
also profoundly determined by external 
economic, political and military dynamics, 
in short: the forces of globalisation. State 
institutions are confronted with a wide 
variety of internal and external challenges 
and their ability to deal with these will, we 
argue, depend to a large extent on whether 
they are “organically” and tightly 
connected to what we identify as 
customary institutions. 
3.1. Custom matters 
We found that in all six countries or 
regions customary governance matters. 
The role of customary organisation in all 
countries is fundamentally important to 
functioning governance. Its relationship to 
state governance, however, varies 
considerably, from Tonga at one end of the 
continuum, where the customary sphere 
and the state sphere are almost identical 
(Tonga might be called a customary state) 
to East Timor on the other, where the 
customary sphere has been largely 
sidelined by international organizations 
and the ideological orientation of the post 
independence state. Vanuatu, 
Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and 
Papua New Guinea are arrayed between 
these two poles.  
What then is customary governance? This 
is a complex question, both in practical as 
well as theoretical terms. Contemporary 
‘customary institutions’, ‘customary ways’ 
etc. are not the institutions and ways of the 
pre-contact and pre-colonial past. 
Traditional societies everywhere in the 
world have come into contact with outside 
influences; they have not been left 
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unchanged by the powers of — originally 
European — capitalist expansion, 
colonialism, imperialism and globalisation. 
This holds true even for the most remote 
parts of the Global South, including the 
countries and regions considered in this 
project. In practice there are no clear-cut 
boundaries between the realm of the 
exogenous ‘modern’ and the endogenous 
‘customary’, but instead processes of 
assimilation, articulation, transformation 
and/or adoption are at the interface of the 
global/exogenous and the local/indigenous 
(Rumsey 2006; White 2006). We 
nevertheless use the terms ‘custom’, 
‘customary institutions’ etc. because they 
expose specific local indigenous 
characteristics that distinguish them from 
introduced institutions that belong to the 
realm of the state and civil society.  
It is clear in the Melanesian countries 
(Vanuatu, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, 
PNG’s Southern Highlands Province), that 
local systems of customary authority 
continue to provide significant levels of 
social order with relatively high degrees of 
legitimacy in the local context. This is also 
true of customary authorities in much of 
rural East Timor. It would be a mistake to 
imagine, however, that customary 
governance is therefore clear, 
systematised, or readily definable. There is 
a working, practical reality to customary 
governance, but it is also under 
considerable, increasing and variable 
pressures from both within and without 
(Southern Highlands Province is a striking 
example). Confusion over customary land 
boundaries, over the proper roles of 
customary leaders and at times over who 
should be recognised as customary leaders, 
is widespread and was identified as a 
significant source of problems and conflict 
in all the Melanesian cases. Even as most 
people, particularly in the rural areas, are 
closer to the values of tradition than to the 
values of Western societies, they do not 
necessarily retain knowledge of whole 
traditional systems or practices in which 
those values are embedded. 
There is an intense debate occurring in the 
Melanesian countries about the meaning of 
custom and customary leadership. To an 
outsider, this debate might at first seem to 
be essentially concerned with establishing 
cultural authenticity through efforts to 
draw clear links with the past. There is a 
great desire on the part of many people to 
establish a sense of what is truly ‘their 
own’ and a confidence in ‘being 
themselves’ in the face of rapid, often 
confusing and at times destructive change. 
Grasping one’s own traditions is one way 
of seeking that confidence and asserting 
collective identity. Moreover, custom is 
also a powerful source of legitimacy; and 
an important determinant of normative 
order. If people or institutions can 
legitimate their position or action through 
custom, this gives them considerable 
authority and power. In this way, ‘custom’ 
is identified as a source of collective 
authenticity, but it is also highly contested. 
Individuals and groups utilise custom for a 
wide variety of self interested or altruistic 
purposes. 
Debates about custom take place at a 
number of different levels simultaneously. 
Custom generally refers to the past as 
ancestral tradition (however clear or 
otherwise past practices might be). But 
custom is also about what the experiences 
of the past can teach the present. Debates 
about custom focus on how people might 
draw from bodies of collective wisdom or 
practice to deal with the new situations 
facing contemporary social and political 
life. Thus debate on custom always raises 
questions of fundamental social values and 
of the shape and character of political 
community. Debate about leadership and 
States Emerging from Hybrid Political Orders – Pacific Experiences 
ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 11,  September 2008  Page 12 
  
the proper relationship between leaders 
and communities, about systems of 
authority, governance and accountability 
(who should lead, by what right should 
they lead, to whom and how should they 
be answerable) and about gender relations 
are particularly prominent. The language 
of these debates is the language of 
custom—people in rural areas rarely see 
themselves as involved in ‘governance’, 
the ‘state’ or in generating higher levels of 
‘political accountability’, yet these are 
some of the issues they are struggling with. 
Now that different custom groups are 
living together, intermarrying, carrying out 
business together and so on, which custom 
(from the range of cultural life across the 
countries) is the most salient to the 
particular issue at hand? Who are the ‘real’ 
customary leaders and how can they be 
identified? How does custom shape 
ownership and usage of land under 
conditions of considerable change, namely 
intrusion of the (globalised) market and 
cash economy? These are questions that 
are widely discussed and debated, 
particularly in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, 
Bougainville and Southern Highlands 
Province, PNG. 
Current debates about custom also engage 
issues of national identity and self-
determination—what constitutes local but 
also emerging national identities, and on 
what basis the people(s) can chart a 
collective path that enables them to 
address (and where necessary resist) 
international and globalising forces which 
might be inimical to public well being? 
This is complicated as ancestral practices 
were, and continue to be, largely localised. 
Custom as a basis for national identity, 
which in Vanuatu, for example, became a 
focus in the drive to national independence 
and has continued as part of the ongoing 
process of state formation, and which in 
Bougainville is utilised in the formation of 
a Bougainvillean identity and state, is 
necessarily a modern evolution of custom, 
which contains but also reshapes ancestral 
practices. In the Melanesian context this 
has led to the development of what is often 
called kastom, a Pidgin derivative of 
‘custom’ (Moore 2004: 27). Kastom has 
developed since the period of initial 
contact with foreigners and colonisation, 
incorporating exogenous influences into 
‘original’ custom and adapting custom to 
those influences; indigenised Christianity 
in particular has become a decisive feature 
of kastom. Kastom is nowadays often 
referred to by both politicians and 
‘grassroots’ people in Melanesia in order 
to stress their cultural heritage and the 
distinctiveness of their own ways from 
introduced ways, often depicting kastom as 
rooted in ancient pre-colonial traditions 
(ibid.). In fact, the strength of kastom is an 
expression of the resilience of Melanesian 
communities, and the concept of kastom is 
deliberately used to empower local people 
in confrontation with outside influences. 
In other words, while custom is in some 
respects intrinsically conservative, it also 
has a strong dynamic and adaptive 
element. Custom is not static, but subject 
to change and can itself become a force for 
change. 
By no means are all (perhaps not even a 
majority of) customary leaders alive to this 
more dynamic sense of custom, but many 
are nevertheless struggling to give some 
leadership to their communities in rapidly 
changing and often confusing times. Some 
leaders explicitly question how traditional 
culture might be able to play a positive 
role in development. There is a tremendous 
(and potentially creative) tension between 
custom as ancestral forms of social, 
spiritual, political and economic life 
(currents of which continue to have great 
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power) and custom as innovative forms of 
community life and leadership that are 
nevertheless shaped by, or foregrounded in 
tradition.  
This dynamic dimension of custom 
becomes clear when it comes to important 
dimensions of change such as urbanisation, 
which brings together people from 
different regions or islands thereby mixing 
different customary ways. In a number of 
cases chiefs or other customary authorities 
have established mechanisms whereby 
different custom groupings are represented 
and managed by ‘local’ chiefs living in 
urban centres. These mechanisms are still 
in the process of being formed and refined 
in important ways, but by and large they 
have been contributing to social stability. 
The dynamic approach to custom is also 
clear, for example, in the way people talk 
about how to deal with the problem of 
growing poverty or growing numbers of 
unemployed young people, often with little 
clear affiliation with custom authorities. 
No doubt discussions of creative 
approaches are needed whereby custom 
can play a constructive role for these 
sectors of the population, living in novel, 
different and difficult circumstances. 
Hence the various dimensions of change 
—urbanisation, monetarisation, 
(un)employment in the cash economy and 
intermarriages—put severe pressure on 
custom, but there are clear indications that 
custom has a capacity to adapt and 
contribute to solutions of problems 
generated by social change. Successes 
vary, with positive examples particularly 
from Vanuatu and Bougainville, whereas 
the Solomon Islands and the Southern 
Highlands Province are more problematic.  
While in the Melanesian countries, debates 
revolve around custom and how to 
preserve it, the situation in Tonga is 
different. As custom is deeply enshrined in 
the institutions of the state, the debate in 
Tonga has another twist; it is focused on 
‘modernisation’, particularly 
democratisation, and how to achieve this in 
ways that are compatible with custom. In 
East Timor, finally, the agenda of 
‘modern’ state-building and the 
accompanying forms of competitive 
(party) politics and factionalism are at 
present overpowering any genuine debate 
about the role of custom in governance, 
with customary forms of governance 
marginalised and to a large extent usurped 
by modern (party) politics. As a result, by 
largely ignoring existing community and 
customary governance, state-building 
efforts in East Timor are weakening the 
state’s potential for legitimacy, capacity 
and participation. 
In all of these countries discussions are 
needed to clarify customary roles and 
functions in relation to state and civil 
society, taking into account the different 
customary systems across the respective 
countries, and to encourage appropriate 
institutional mechanisms for passing on 
traditions and customary norms. ‘Bridging’ 
institutions committed to custom but able 
to speak with government, are capable of 
organizing such future-oriented debates 
and of providing a forum for what are 
often active topics of village conversation. 
The Malvatumauri National Council of 
Chiefs in Vanuatu and the Vanuatu 
Cultural Centre provide examples of such 
bridging institutions. We consider that 
bridging bodies of some kind, able to link 
custom to government and to some extent 
government to custom (or local 
communities in the case of Tonga), are 
urgently needed in the other countries as 
well. 
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3.2. The forces of globalisation 
The countries and regions studied exist 
within a geopolitical space that is 
dominated to a very large extent by 
Australia and New Zealand as well as East 
and South East Asian countries. This wider 
region exists in turn within a world which 
has become increasingly globalised over 
the past decades. It is assumed by most 
economic and political commentators that 
globalisation is positive. Globalisation, 
however, does not necessarily or 
automatically result in benefits to 
developing countries. Nor are developing 
countries necessarily enabled to create the 
conditions within which sustainable 
development can occur, citizens’ needs can 
be satisfied and flexible and responsive 
political systems developed.  
On the contrary, globalisation can also 
generate the opposite consequences. What 
is now known as “negative globalisation” 
can undermine the positive outcomes that 
flow from trying to develop capable, 
effective and legitimate state mechanisms. 
It does so by undermining the capacity of 
state institutions to resist or manage 
external pressures or even to police 
internationally accepted regulations 
(operating customs regimes or protecting 
against resource stripping for example). In 
the Pacific, while there is not great 
pressure on the part of international capital 
to develop labour intensive industries, 
there is pressure to break down trade and 
other barriers in the international market 
and to secure access to whatever tradable 
commodities exist, regardless of the cost to 
social cohesion or local livelihoods. Most 
small to medium sized states are unable to 
resist these influences and Pacific micro 
states face an almost impossible task trying 
to do so. In Vanuatu, for example, 
communally owned land is subject to 
significant annexation by expatriate 
Australians and New Zealanders seeking 
access to relatively cheap tropical sites for 
investment in tourist resorts, holiday 
properties and for retirement purposes. 
Although the land is held by the customary 
landowners, under Vanuatu law these 
customary landowners can lease their land 
to foreigners for up to 75 years. At the end 
of this time the owners have a right to 
resume their properties but only if they can 
compensate the lessees for capital 
improvements. This is proving almost 
impossible where hotels and expensive 
houses have been built with the result that 
short term gain to the owners is followed 
by long term annexation.  This is one 
example of negative regionalisation/ 
globalisation in the Pacific. There are 
many others that could be cited as well. In 
relation to fishing or logging licenses, for 
example, none of the countries in this 
study have been able to negotiate deals that 
have been mutually beneficial. In different 
ways these problems pose short and long 
term costs to the local economies. 
Globalisation is generating a relatively 
borderless global economy, and the 
multinational corporate institutions that 
dominate this economy are beginning to 
pose fundamental challenges to the 
conceptual and geographical boundaries of 
the nation state.   
In the first place, as we have seen from the 
examples above, a global market place that 
can transcend traditional state boundaries 
is generating increasing economic, 
political and social inequality. This is 
fuelling a growing sense of personal and 
political grievance as more and more 
people feel excluded from the benefits of 
both national development and 
globalisation. These grievances are 
connected to an expansion of lawlessness 
and armed violence. This is certainly the 
case in the urban centres of Vanuatu, the 
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Solomons, Papua New Guinea, East Timor 
and Tonga. All of these places have seen a 
rapid expansion of the under 25 
demographic, many of whom concentrate 
in urban and peri-urban areas without 
visible means of support. They are 
unemployed or under-employed and resort 
to crime to make ends meet. This means 
that there are constant challenges to the 
development and maintenance of national 
legal and political regimes and an 
unfortunate tendency to resort to the threat 
and use of force to maintain order. This is 
so in all of the cases under review. 
In circumstances where state systems did 
not take firm root in the first place, where 
domestic legal and judicial systems are 
weak, and where political leadership 
engages in corrupt and illegal activity, 
external actors can generate powerful 
negative dynamics which undermine the 
well intentioned behaviour of those 
struggling to uphold norms of good 
governance, whether customary or formal. 
Most of the states in Melanesia, for 
example, have been affected by external 
actors (both political and commercial) who 
have used their power and resources to 
advance their own interests. This external 
interference is sometimes blatant and 
sometimes subtle, but external actors are 
normally able to generate pressures which 
internal decision makers cannot resist. 
It is not in the interests of international 
commercial interests, for example, to 
strengthen the regulatory capacity of either 
the state or the customary sectors in 
primary commodity economies—
especially not the latter since customary 
orders highlight the collectivity over the 
individual and cooperation over 
competition. In the Solomon Islands, for 
example, in recent times, locals have been 
given training in sustainable minerals 
mining and what might constitute 
appropriate regulatory frameworks for 
controlling foreign mining companies. The 
new graduates have been given positions 
in the Department of Mines. Because they 
are paid at such parlous rates and because 
there is no clear career progression in these 
departments this “social capital” is 
poached by the minerals companies 
seeking mining licences or wishing to 
negotiate more favourable royalty 
arrangements. This expropriation of local 
talent for transnational corporate purposes 
generates even weaker infrastructure and 
capacity in countries like the Solomons. 
Thus globalisation along the lines of the 
dominant neoliberal ideology has led to a 
regression from certain levels of state and 
regulatory capacity that have been 
achieved already. The “dynamics of the 
global system itself have undermined the 
mechanisms … through which states have 
to be maintained” (Clapham 2003: 44). 
The Solomon Islands is a particular and 
drastic case in point. Here and elsewhere 
the state’s core operational and regulatory 
functions were deliberately reduced due to 
a neoliberal agenda that targeted state 
institutions. 
To summarise, the activities of 
international corporations, of illegal 
economic entities and also the economic 
interests and policies of the ‘strong’ states 
of the developed world have contributed to 
the increasing fragility of states in the 
Global South. The South Pacific 
Melanesian and Polynesian states are no 
exception. All of the six countries or 
regions in this study have had to struggle 
with the effects of negative globalisation. 
It is important to be cognisant of this 
international context as we now look at 
each country in more detail before 
proceeding to some comparisons and 
general conclusions.    
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4. A broad spectrum of situations 
Our research reaffirms the urgent need for 
highly contextualised analysis. Often 
conditions differ even across a single 
country.
6
 There are not consistent 
approaches in any of the countries studied 
in relation to the interaction of custom and 
liberal state governance. This variation is a 
warning against overly-generalised 
assessments of ‘state fragility’ and generic 
approaches to ‘state-building’. What is 
needed are highly targeted policies 
grounded in a concrete analysis of the 
situation on the ground. That is, what 
works in Vanuatu may not work in the 
Solomon Islands (not to speak of East 
Timor). Nevertheless, comparisons are 
instructive and can suggest paths forward. 
We have identified a number of 
commonalities as well as differences 
across the six cases, and we have identified 
certain ‘lessons learned’ that can be taken 
into consideration when reflecting on other 
(similar) cases. Before addressing 
commonalities and differences in the seven 
above-mentioned areas of governance, 
brief overviews over the general 
characteristics of the current state of 
political order in the six countries are 
given here as a background for the 
comparisons that follow. The common 
framework for the overviews is provided 
by the focus on the strength of custom and 
the articulation of state institutions and 
custom in the respective case study 
countries. 
                                                 
6 This holds particularly true for Papua New Guinea. 
Research on Bougainville on the one hand and 
Southern Highlands Province on the other hand reveal 
so strikingly different situations that the fact that 
these regions both belong to the ‘nation-state’ of 
Papua New Guinea is almost negligible. Tonga sits on 
the other pole of the spectrum. Given its unified 
structures of governance, it can actually be dealt with 
as one entity of analysis. 
Bougainville 
Bougainville represents a ‘post-war’ type of 
a fragile state environment. The island 
suffered from a decade-long (1988 to 1998) 
large-scale violent conflict, the bloodiest 
encounter in the South Pacific since the end 
of the Second World War. Rapid social 
change, most notably brought about by a 
large copper mining project (the Panguna 
mine), was at the root of the conflict.  
Militant protests against the mine, caused by 
the environmental degradation and social 
disintegration associated with it, escalated 
into full-scale violent confrontation between 
the PNG military and a secessionist guerrilla 
force, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
(BRA), transforming the conflict over the 
mine into a struggle for independence. 
However, beneath the overarching structure 
of that war, long-standing conflicts between 
different clans and other customary groups 
were also fought out violently. 
The war period can be considered a time of 
statelessness in (large parts of) Bougainville. 
The PNG government no longer held a 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force, 
nor did the secessionist movement manage 
to establish one (Boege 2006: 4-6). This 
created the environment for a renaissance of 
non-state customary institutions. In large 
parts of the island they again took a central 
role in community life, due to the absence of 
state institutions and motivated by the 
desperate nature of the situation. In many 
places elders and chiefs again became 
responsible for the organisation of everyday 
life in a far more comprehensive manner 
than in the period before the war. Elders and 
chiefs referred to longstanding customary 
norms when regulating conflicts and 
organizing community life. 
In 1997/1998 fighting came to an end. A 
stable process of post-conflict peacebuilding 
and negotiation ensued. So far, this has been 
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one of the rare success stories of recent 
peace-building endeavours, primarily 
because of the comprehensive utilisation of 
customary institutions and methods of 
conflict resolution and the combination of 
bottom-up and top-down approaches to 
peacebuilding. At present we are witnessing 
the transition from a phase of post-conflict 
peacebuilding to a phase of state formation, 
the framework of which is provided by the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) of 
August 2001. The BPA establishes 
Bougainville as an autonomous region 
within PNG, with the option of full 
independence further down the track. 
As an autonomous region Bougainville is not 
an independent state, but its far-reaching 
autonomy and the prospect of becoming 
independent in a decade or so provide the 
people and government with the option of 
building a political entity sui generis. In 
doing so, they rely heavily on the positive 
experiences of the post-conflict 
peacebuilding phase. As customary 
institutions proved effective in 
peacebuilding, there is a strong case for their 
utilisation in the current state-building 
process as well. A desire to “marry” 
customary and introduced institutions and 
processes is strong all over Bougainville. 
Customary institutions figure prominently in 
the new constitution of the Autonomous 
Region of Bougainville. The political order 
in Bougainville combines elements of the 
Western model of statehood (a president and 
parliament, a constitution, free and fair 
elections, a public service) and elements of 
customary governance (councils of elders 
and councils of chiefs, customary law and 
conflict resolution).  
The specific context of current state fragility 
is characterised by gradual improvement of 
capacities, effectiveness, political will and 
legitimacy. Setbacks, however, cannot be 
excluded. The utilisation of the 
complementary strengths of actors and 
institutions from the three realms of state, 
customary governance and civil society, and 
the appropriate management and resolution 
of incompatibilities, is crucial for future 
success. Despite severe problems, 
Bougainville is on a positive track. It is not 
appropriate to assess Bougainville in terms 
of ‘state fragility’. Rather, it is a hybrid 
political order (with strong institutions of 
customary governance) in the process of 
state formation. Custom is relatively strong, 
and there is considerable articulation of state 
and custom. The political order in 
Bougainville is genuinely home-grown; 
external assistance has been moderate 
(Boege 2006). 
Vanuatu 
Unlike Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, 
the Southern Highlands Province of PNG 
and East Timor, Vanuatu is not struggling 
with a legacy of recent violent conflict, nor 
is the country marked by entrenched 
problems of law and order. On the contrary, 
the country is peaceful and stable. 
Nevertheless, Vanuatu has suffered some 
serious localised and sporadic violence in 
the past and certainly faces real threats to 
social stability and order from the impacts 
of globalisation and rapid social change. 
Urbanisation, increasing pressure on rural 
resources, unemployment (particularly of 
youth) and the rate of effective alienation of 
customary land are cases in point. There is 
considerable friction, confusion and 
regulatory ambiguity in the interaction of 
the custom and market economies. The 
potential for serious social erosion, 
criminality and civil violence is probably 
greatest here. Land is under great pressure 
from the growth in tourism and other 
developments, as well as from the 
movement of people from outer islands to 
the two main towns and rapid population 
increase. Customary land tenure does not fit 
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easily with the demands of the commercial 
market, yet local commercial enterprise and 
appropriate foreign investment are vital for 
economic growth and the provision of 
services which people increasingly value. 
Vanuatu’s critical liability as it faces these 
problems is the disconnection of the formal, 
national political structures of government 
from much of the lived social reality of the 
country and the erosion of traditional 
mechanisms of social control and support 
without the corresponding emergence of 
new ordering mechanisms. It is important to 
recognise that independence and formal 
statehood are very recent phenomena for 
Vanuatu, only being achieved in 1980. Ever 
since, independence and state-building for 
Vanuatu has meant the development of 
liberal governance structures on top of 
many small scale, traditional, clan-based 
political, economic and social orders. While 
the institutions of the state are more or less 
respected, their recent emergence means 
that they do not have deep roots into 
society, and tend to be disconnected from 
people’s values, practices and local 
structures of authority. This seriously 
weakens the state’s institutional capacity to 
undertake some fundamental tasks of 
governance: to forge some consensus out of 
conflicting interests or needs, to adjudicate 
disputes, to manage change or to equitably 
manage national resources.  
The disconnection of formal governance 
structures creates weak accountability 
measures and can engender elite 
competition and corruption in government, 
which further weakens government capacity 
to handle the confusions and conflicting 
forces engendered by social change. 
Nevertheless, Vanuatu is socially resilient. 
So far it has operated within sustainable 
ecological boundaries and pays considerable 
attention to customary actors and 
institutions (‘kastom’) which are crucial to 
social order in the local context of people’s 
everyday lives. This is not a static state of 
affairs as customary governance is under 
considerable pressure. A lively debate about 
‘kastom’, its adaptation to far-reaching 
societal change and its interaction with the 
formal sphere of state governance is under 
way. What may be distinctive about 
Vanuatu in this context is the existence of 
bridging mechanisms which link 
government, custom, churches, and to some 
extent business. These can be institutions or 
simply regular spaces for and habits of 
dialogue between agencies; they assist 
national processes of debate. In particular, 
customary authorities have formed a 
‘hybrid’ national organization loosely 
linking customary authorities across the 
country through the Malvatumauri National 
Council of Chiefs (MNCC). This enables a 
‘customary voice’ to speak at the national 
level on issues of importance to custom, and 
by extension, of importance to much of the 
rural population, which includes 
approximately 80 percent of ni-Vanuatu. 
The MNCC and similar institutions together 
with government and civil society are 
currently addressing the particularly 
complex tasks of state formation. Grounded 
in the present hybridity of political order, 
Vanuatu currently is the place of a largely 
endogenous process of state emergence, 
based on strong customary institutions and 
relatively high levels of articulation of state 
institutions and custom.    
Solomon Islands 
Like Bougainville and East Timor, the 
Solomon Islands (SI) is in a post-conflict 
situation. The violent conflict was, 
however, at a considerably lower level 
than those of the other two cases. It was 
confined to the main islands of 
Guadalcanal and Malaita and the capital 
city of Honiara (on Guadalcanal) in 
particular. The conflict was mainly caused 
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by disputes over land between local 
Guadalcanal people and immigrants from 
Malaita, particularly in Honiara and in its 
vicinity. The land situation was aggravated 
by population growth and growing 
unemployment in the formal sector. 
Competition over jobs and land escalated 
in the late 1990s. Anti-Malaitan 
resentment spread among the 
Guadalcanalese as the Malaitans were seen 
as being over-represented in politics, 
dominating business and state 
administration and thus able to push the 
burden of social change onto the 
Guadalcanal population. A militant 
Guadalcanalese movement emerged that 
took over the long-standing smouldering 
land disputes and demanded as a ‘solution’ 
the return of the Malaitans to their own 
island. As a response to attacks on 
Malaitans on Guadalcanal and their forced 
eviction, Malaitan settlers formed their 
own militia and fought back. Over time, 
Malaitan and Guadalcanalese militias as 
well as the (paramilitary) police forces 
became entangled in increasingly complex 
and ‘blurred’ violent encounters. As the 
majority of the state security forces sided 
with the militias or fell into complete 
disarray, the state lost its monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence.  
Although the Solomon Islands has been 
identified as a “fragile state” since the 
tensions of 1998-2003, for the majority of 
Solomon Islanders life continued mostly 
undisturbed during the times of conflict, 
based on a largely intact subsistence 
economy and effective forms of customary 
governance. Nevertheless, the central 
government and state institutions came 
under severe pressure due to the tensions. 
In 2003 the government asked for and 
received outside intervention. Since then 
the Australian-led Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has 
successfully assisted in the maintenance of 
law and order. In its first phase RAMSI 
was dominated by foreign (mainly 
Australian) military and the police, who 
were extremely successful in tracking 
down, disarming and dissolving militias, 
criminal gangs and other non-state actors. 
However, from the very beginning RAMSI 
was conceptualised not as a mere police-
military intervention with short-term goals, 
but as a far more comprehensive 
endeavour that also aimed at economic 
development, sustainable governance and 
capacity-building for the SI, particularly in 
the fields of law and order, and machinery 
of government.  
RAMSI is in its fifth year now, and 
Australia has committed itself to stay for at 
least several more years. RAMSI is the 
most comprehensive and ambitious 
endeavour of external assistance in the 
southwest Pacific region. It has become 
clear over time, however, that the long-
term state-building goals of RAMSI will 
be much more difficult to achieve than the 
immediate goals of halting conflicts and 
disarming militias and gangs. The more 
questionable dimensions of the mission are 
increasingly apparent. Today the general 
impression in SI is that RAMSI “is 
happening to” the country. Local 
ownership is lacking, and there is an over-
dependency on RAMSI which is perceived 
as the ‘real government’ by many—a 
‘government’, one has to keep in mind, 
that is not accountable to the people that it 
governs, but to external actors. The 
underlying causes of the tensions and the 
violent conflicts have not been addressed 
so far. Current efforts to build the 
capacities of local institutions have only 
led to limited results. Doubts that 
sustainable structures of political order and 
governance can be built ‘the RAMSI way’ 
are on the rise.  
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RAMSI today is in “an ambiguous 
position. On the one hand, it claims to be 
merely assisting a sovereign government 
which has invited it to be there and can ask 
it to leave; on the other hand it seeks to 
challenge that government’s procedures, 
policies and probity for the sake of the 
Solomon Islands people” (Firth 2008: 14). 
The people, however, have a relatively 
vague concept of what the state and the 
government is or does, because its reach is 
limited, its representatives have limited 
contact with citizens, the services provided 
are minimal, and it is not considered either 
trustworthy or reliable. Because of this, 
most people prefer customary mechanisms 
of governance to formal state institutions, 
with the result that formal government in 
the Solomons appears to be an abstract and 
somewhat epiphenomenal system in 
relation to their daily lives. Custom is still 
relatively strong in the local context in 
many areas, but dislocated from the formal 
state system. Customary chiefs, village 
elders and other traditional authorities are 
increasingly asking how they can utilise 
their traditional legitimacy and their 
capacities to facilitate creative change and 
play a positive role in development and 
state formation processes. The challenge 
facing the Solomons is how to 
acknowledge the diverse communities in 
existence within its sovereign territory, 
what it is that unites them, and how to 
establish a new compact between these 
groups and the state. The people of the 
Solomons are grappling with the 
complexity of these challenges and 
working out how family, kin and 
provincial identities can be combined with 
coherent notions of national identity and 
citizenship and how this can be done in 
ways that reinforce the strengths of both 
the communities and the state. Similar to 
Bougainville and Vanuatu, the Solomon 
Islands today is a hybrid political order 
engaged in a complex process of state 
formation, albeit with the additional 
dynamics of external assistance, and rather 
poor articulation of state and custom. 
Southern Highlands Province 
The Southern Highlands Province (SHP) in 
Papua New Guinea is the richest province 
in PNG in terms of both natural resources 
and the provincial budget, and at the same 
time it is one of the poorest according to 
human development indicators. Southern 
Highlands is a region where customary 
institutions have come under immense 
pressure from modernisation, in particular 
extractive industries projects, urbanisation 
and the introduction of the cash economy. 
This has led to a considerable breakdown 
of customary mechanisms of governance 
and conflict management, not so much in 
relatively remote rural areas, but definitely 
in areas closer to urban centres or 
development sites. At the same time, the 
institutions of the state have continued to 
lack effectiveness and legitimacy. 
Transparency and accountability of state-
based governance have virtually 
disappeared. 
The national government barely penetrates 
the province, though the 2006/2007 state-
of-emergency is welcomed by most 
stakeholders. The provincial government 
still faces many challenges to become a 
fully functioning government and lacks 
popular support from many sectors, except 
those directly and immediately benefiting 
from connections with the various public 
offices assembled under the provincial 
government, usually through thinly-veiled 
cash handouts.  
The situation in the Southern Highlands is 
characterised by a considerable degree of 
unruliness and widespread violence at 
various levels, from domestic violence 
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through to criminal violence, to large-scale 
inter-group violence (‘tribal warfare’), 
particularly concerning the access to and 
distribution of revenues from the extractive 
resources projects. Compared to the other 
cases, the SHP presents the most difficult 
environment with regard to governance 
and conflict management, not only in the 
wider provincial context, but often also in 
the local context. Nevertheless, islands of 
functionality exist in the midst of political 
and social fragmentation and breakdown. 
Human development success stories in the 
SHP appear thin on the ground, but there 
are gains being made. This is mainly due 
to the efforts of civil society organisations, 
the churches, and committed individuals 
(including women leaders) from various 
sectors. The churches in particular have 
demonstrated capacity, effectiveness and 
legitimacy. 
The main problem for governance in the 
Southern Highlands is that the institutions 
and values of the introduced liberal 
democratic state have not (yet) taken root, 
customary institutions have been 
considerably weakened and civil society 
institutions struggle to survive in a non-
conducive environment. There are only a 
few isolated connections and collaborative 
efforts between the spheres of state, 
custom and civil society. Any efforts to 
improve governance, however, will have to 
build on the cooperation of legitimate 
authorities and institutions from each of 
these spheres. The present situation in 
Southern Highlands Province can be 
accurately described as fragile (more so 
than the other cases, with the exception of 
East Timor, which is a very different 
story). Custom has been considerably 
weakened, and articulation of state and 
custom is low. 
 
Tonga   
The Kingdom of Tonga was unified by a 
Tongan chief in 1845 and ever since avoided 
becoming a direct colony of a European 
power. Tonga was proclaimed a British 
protected state in 1900 before achieving full 
sovereignty in 1970. The Tongan 
constitution dates back to 1875, it reinforces 
the power of the monarch and nobility 
through provisions on succession, 
inheritance laws, land tenure etc. As well as 
the powers detailed in the Constitution, the 
King has significant authority derived from 
his rank in traditional chiefly descent. Unlike 
the Melanesian states, Tonga has a highly 
centralised political system under the 
monarchy which is very much top-down and 
leaves little space for customary governance 
and community engagement at the local 
level. Moreover, unlike the other case study 
countries Tonga is ethnolinguistically 
homogenous, and it has no formal protection 
of custom law, as Tongan values and culture 
are woven into existing constitutional 
structures. Whereas custom in the other 
countries and regions studied can offer a 
channel to link communities with 
government and enhance participation, 
customary governance in Tonga has in many 
respects been subsumed into the national 
political elite. This reflects the rather 
different customary arrangements and 
cultural milieu, as well as different histories. 
The political and social stability grounded in 
this system has been increasingly challenged 
since the 1980s, with a growing democracy 
movement from a strengthened civil society 
demanding greater participation of common 
citizens in governing the affairs of the state. 
The protracted public service strike in 2005 
and particularly the riots and arson in the 
capital city of Nuku’alofa in November 2006 
have changed perceptions of security and 
order, and external observers came to label 
Tonga as a ‘fragile state’ due to these 
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incidents. But “destructive though they were, 
the riots did not threaten the state itself and 
are hastening the small kingdom’s overdue 
transition to a more democratic constitution” 
(Firth 2008: 16). 
No doubt there is considerable frustration 
in Tonga today about limited avenues for 
participation in governance, and issues of 
leadership, representation and political and 
constitutional reform are central to public 
debates. However, the current government 
has initiated steps to address concerns over 
the accountability and transparency of the 
government and state institutions; at the 
same time as cultural and community 
leaders are gradually focusing on bottom-
up governance. The democracy movement 
is giving voice to the widespread desire for 
social and political change. 
The Tongan constitutional monarchy 
combines indigenous and introduced forms 
of governance and is rooted in a strong 
cultural identity (‘the Tongan way’). It is 
nevertheless confronted with the need to 
adapt to comprehensive change both in the 
domestic sphere and the wider global 
community, due to the important role of 
Tongan diasporas and overseas 
remittances, which are crucial for a 
country with otherwise extremely 
constrained economic options and limited 
natural resources. 
Political and social change is a potential 
source of unrest and instability, but for the 
time being the prospects for negotiated and 
consensual reform are good. Far from 
being a fragile state, Tonga is a society and 
state in transformation, with little external 
interference. The articulation of state and 
custom is high, given the degree to which 
the Tongan constitutional monarchy is 
embedded in custom.  
 
East Timor 
Violence in East Timor far exceeded that 
experienced by the post-conflict situations 
in Bougainville and Solomon Islands. East 
Timor is still in the early stages of 
peacebuilding and recovery, and state 
formation is very much influenced and 
hampered by the legacy of the large-scale 
violent conflict. National political life is 
highly polarised and division among key 
leaders can cause violence at the 
community level and obstruct management 
of problems. The social and political 
relationships that make up local 
communities in East Timor are more 
vulnerable and fragile than in the Pacific 
islands case studies.  
Significant international assistance directed 
towards state-building appears to have been 
highly centralised in Dili, where it has 
focussed on building national government 
institutions. The rural majority of the 
population has received relatively little 
attention. Government institutions continue 
to have little capacity for outreach beyond 
Dili, and further they also have little 
connection with the customary governance 
practices that still provide much of the social 
order in the local context, particularly in 
rural areas. This disconnection between the 
government, highly centralised in Dili, and 
the large rural population has led to the 
marginalisation of both local culture and 
rural communities more generally. As a 
consequence, many people do not find 
themselves at home in the form and 
language of the state that they now 
supposedly inhabit as ‘citizens’. There is a 
widespread sense that the new state has 
marginalised East Timorese culture and 
customary life as sources of governance. 
The crucial misperception of both the 
external actors and many in the Timorese 
political elite (who have often spent a long 
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time in exile) was to see East Timor after the 
liberation from Indonesian occupation as a 
tabula rasa – a place void of governance 
institutions where state-building could and 
would have to start ‘from scratch’. Contrary 
to that assumption, customary values and 
governance institutions continue to play a 
significant role in people’s everyday life. 
Indeed, since independence there has been 
an extraordinary resurgence of customary 
practices, many of which were repressed 
under Indonesian occupation. They 
contribute to conflict management, social 
order and social welfare in the local context, 
but are widely ignored by the East Timorese 
political elites and the international donors—
with considerable negative consequences. 
The wide-spread violence in 2006 (four 
years after formal independence), violence 
during and following national elections in 
2007 and, most recently, the near-fatal 
shooting of the President and the attack on 
the Prime Minister in February 2008 indicate 
East Timor’s instability. Tens of thousands 
of people continue to live as displaced 
persons in refugee camps in and around the 
capital, urban street gangs are a source of 
ongoing insecurity, the national security 
forces remain deeply divided, and the 
government depends on the protection and 
support of international police and military. 
Local explanations for the unrest are 
registering that fundamental values and 
institutions of indigenous East Timorese 
culture and custom that were an essential 
part of the struggle for independence and 
that remain fundamental to people’s sense of 
collective meaning and management of 
community life are being ‘overlooked’ by 
the new state (Trindade and Castro 2007). 
Efforts to rapidly introduce liberal 
governance norms and structures without 
paying attention to how they interact with 
local customary values have contributed to 
the erosion of institutions and cultural values 
underpinning order and have led to the 
adoption of often very poorly understood 
liberal norms (particularly in urban areas). 
As a consequence, the notion of ‘democracy’ 
has become widely identified with ‘conflict 
between competing factions of the political 
elite’ and with ‘top-down imposition of 
values’, ‘democracy’ and ‘Timorese culture’ 
are perceived as being antagonistic.  
There is little conversation and connection 
between the customary and state spheres. If 
it continues, the failure to bridge the gap 
between national government structures and 
customary institutions is likely to cause 
further serious problems. 
State-building efforts in East Timor are in 
danger of trying to produce a state that 
people do not recognise as their own, or 
from which they feel alienated in important 
ways. It can be hypothesised that this is a 
result of internal and external state-builders 
neglecting and (unintentionally) 
undermining community and customary 
sources of order and resilience, contributing 
to the ongoing instability in East Timor. 
While custom is still strong in East Timor, 
the articulation of state institutions and 
custom is extremely poor.
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Table 1: Pacific Political Systems and Strength of Custom 
Country 
(Independence) 
Political System Strength of Custom Articulation of state 
and custom 
Vanuatu 
(1980) 
Republic/Democracy High Medium/High 
Solomon Islands 
(1978) 
Democracy Medium Low 
Bougainville  
(2001 autonomy) 
Autonomous Region/ 
Democracy 
High Medium/High 
Tonga 
(1875) 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Medium High 
Southern Highlands 
Province – PNG 
(1975) 
Province/Democracy Medium Low 
East Timor  
(2002) 
Republic/Democracy High Low 
 
 
5. Similarities and differences 
In this section we compare the findings 
from the six countries or regions, 
addressing the seven thematic areas of our 
analyses, and taking into account the 
dimensions of capacities, effectiveness and 
legitimacy as well as complementarity, 
substitution and incompatibility. Certain 
striking similarities and some notable 
differences are revealed. 
5.1. Political economy  
In all our case study countries the 
subsistence/exchange economy is of major 
importance. It is the basis of human 
security in general, and food security in 
particular, for a majority of people. This is 
particularly relevant in the Melanesian 
cases and in East Timor, but also applies to 
Tonga, albeit to a lesser extent. The formal 
market/cash economy plays a 
complementary role particularly in the 
production and marketing of cash crops. It 
impacts on the lives of ordinary people on 
the ground insofar as cash is increasingly 
needed for basic social services 
(particularly school fees, but also health 
services, transport and certain basic 
consumer goods). However, it also plays a 
conflicting role as projects from the market 
economy can clash with the subsistence 
economy, particularly in regard to land 
use. Land use is the source of significant 
past and potential conflict in all six 
countries (with the possible exception of 
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Tonga). Since all questions over land 
involve interaction between custom and 
commercial economies, it is an area 
dogged by confusion, lack of information 
and often lack of mutual understanding on 
the part of both customary landholders and 
non-locals seeking commercial 
development. 
Customary land ownership and use has 
come under pressure from projects that tap 
the rich natural resources of countries and 
communities, including logging 
(particularly Solomon Islands), tourism 
(for example the island of Efate in 
Vanuatu), fishing (the Solomons and 
Vanuatu) or extractive industries 
(Bougainville, PNG Southern Highlands 
Province). While economic activities in 
these areas in principle underpin 
government expenditure, they do not 
necessarily lead to sustainable 
development and can have serious 
detrimental social and environmental 
effects, not least with regard to the 
functioning of customary governance and 
social resilience. The situation in Southern 
Highlands Province of PNG is the most 
obvious case in this regard. However, the 
exploitation of natural resources is seen by 
governments as the most promising way to 
establish an economic base for 
development and for the generation of 
state revenues. Natural resources thus play 
a major role (Bougainville – mining, 
Solomon Islands – logging and mining, 
Southern Highlands Province – 
oil/extractive industries, East Timor – oil 
and gas). In the case of Tonga, which has a 
limited natural resource base, it is 
remittances that are most critical. 
Agriculture, industry and other branches of 
the formal market economy are clearly of 
minor importance compared to the 
subsistence/exchange economy on the one 
hand and natural resource extraction on the 
other hand. Unemployment (particularly 
youth unemployment) in the formal 
economy is high. The public service is the 
major formal employer in all of these 
countries, and at the same time the 
domestic tax base is very narrow due to the 
limits of the formal economy. 
This situation has considerable effects on 
the prospects for state-building along the 
lines of the Western model of the state. On 
the ‘subjective’ side, the absence of the 
link between the state and its citizens 
provided by the collection and payment of 
taxes inevitably impacts on the relationship 
between the state and its citizens. People 
who do not or cannot pay taxes (the 
majority of the population engaged in 
subsistence agriculture in these countries) 
are much less inclined to develop a sense 
of citizenship and a demand for effective 
central governance and accountability. To 
forge a meaningful relationship between 
the state and its citizens in view of the 
seemingly absent ‘glue’ of taxation poses a 
major challenge. The wealth of the 
Southern Highlands Provincial 
government, for example, is not based on 
the taxation of its people (who pay 
negligible sums of tax), but rather taxation 
(and other revenues) of the resource 
companies operating in the province, with 
considerable negative effects for the state-
citizenry relationship. The absence of a 
domestic tax base for fully-fledged state 
structures leads to an over-dependence on 
external sources of income (aid, royalties 
and rents, tariffs and import duties, and in 
the case of Tonga, remittances) or to very 
limited state capacities that in some cases 
had to be reduced even further (e.g. the 
structural adjustment program in the 
Solomon Islands or public sector reform in 
Tonga). Under these conditions 
governments and people will have to 
negotiate the kind of state they want and 
can afford, and then see what is needed in 
States Emerging from Hybrid Political Orders – Pacific Experiences 
ACPACS Occasional Paper Number 11,  September 2008  Page 26 
  
economic and financial terms to sustain 
such a state.  
The potential contribution of customary 
governance to social welfare and order 
should not be underestimated; however, 
ideally it needs to be articulated within the 
overarching framework provided by the 
state. In this context, the notion of 
‘economic growth’ will have to be 
scrutinised and perhaps the weight given to 
economic growth needs to be rethought. 
The social, cultural and environmental 
outcomes of economic growth policies 
have to be taken into account in a much 
more comprehensive manner. Traditional 
social safety nets, customary ownership 
and control of land and other natural 
resources, as well as customary forms of 
governance and maintenance of secure and 
orderly communities can be challenged 
and even destroyed by growth-oriented 
policies, with considerable negative effects 
for political order, stability and state 
formation. 
5.2 Order and security 
The maintenance of order and security is 
an issue in all six countries. The 
contribution of customary governance to 
order, security and peace-building is also 
fundamental in all cases. East Timor, 
Solomon Islands and Bougainville are 
post-conflict locations, in which 
peacebuilding in a whole range of 
dimensions—from reconstruction of 
infrastructure to questions of justice and 
reconciliation—is an important 
prerequisite for state stability. The 
Southern Highlands Province is the theatre 
of protracted localised low-intensity 
conflicts. Vanuatu and Tonga have been 
largely spared violent conflict, although 
there have been incidents of sporadic 
violence including riots and inter-
communal fighting in Vanuatu, and the 
Tongan capital city Nuku’alofa 
experienced heavy riots in November 
2006, with the business district burned to 
ashes and a subsequent state of emergency 
declared.  
The causes of instability and violent 
conflict are very similar in the different 
countries. They largely flow from the 
intense pressures of economic and social 
change coming from a globalised world. 
Key challenges include tension between 
the cash economy and the traditional 
subsistence/exchange economy, the 
growing gulf between those with and 
without access to cash, the position of land 
in the interface of the cash and the 
subsistence economy, and the pressures 
and temptations of resource extraction. 
These challenges are complicated by the 
nexus of demographic change (the ‘youth 
bulge’), migration and urbanisation, 
increasing pressure on land and other rural 
resources and unemployment in the formal 
economy. In particular, the phenomenon of 
large groups of disgruntled unemployed 
young men with no prospects in the formal 
economy, only minor social status and no 
prestige is an issue of concern for the 
maintenance of law and order. These 
individuals may have either previously 
been the footsoldiers of militias or armed 
groups, or they may form the potential 
recruiting pool for criminal gangs. 
It would be misleading, however, to 
overestimate the actual violence and the 
dangers of instability in these countries. 
Most regions within these countries are 
orderly and secure (apart from Southern 
Highlands Province), and people live 
peaceful lives. Violence is generally 
confined to specific ‘hotspots’, notably the 
capital cities, which are the theatres of 
sporadic riots or inter-communal fights 
(Port Vila, Honiara, Mendi, Dili, 
Nuku’alofa) and increasing rates of crime 
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(Port Vila, Honiara, Dili and Nuku’alofa). 
Outer islands and remote rural areas are 
usually much safer. There is a sense of 
wariness or vulnerability in East Timor 
that national political friction might spark 
violence at the grassroots. East Timor also 
suffers from very high rates of domestic 
violence; along with other forms of inter-
personal violence (in particular sorcery and 
retribution against sorcerers); domestic 
violence is also an issue elsewhere, 
particularly in Bougainville and Sothern 
Highlands Province, PNG.  
Nevertheless, customary institutions that can 
provide order and security in the local 
context, if not always in the face of national 
political competition (as in Timor), are still 
strong in the rural areas. In large parts of the 
Solomons, Vanuatu, Bougainville or East 
Timor it is not the institutions of the state 
that provide order and security, but 
traditional authorities like chiefs and elders 
who can rely on the deep-rooted respect of 
their people for the norms and values of their 
communities. In Bougainville, for example, 
police only have a chance to function 
relatively effectively and gain legitimacy 
when working together with the chiefs and 
communities. Police can only access many 
villages after invitation by the chiefs 
(although this is not a legal provision, it is 
the reality on the ground). Wherever the 
customary institutions and processes are 
functioning well they are largely self-
regulating, and the need for state-based 
policing diminishes. 
There is great potential for complementarity 
of efforts from the spheres of the state, 
custom and civil society, particularly the 
churches. Experiences from Bougainville 
(Boege 2008) and Vanuatu (Boege and 
Forsyth 2007) demonstrate that the 
collaboration of chiefs and police has great 
potential to provide order and security. 
Such an approach, however, challenges the 
general notion of the state monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence as a core 
dimension of statehood; but, apart from 
Tonga, the case study countries in reality 
are far from such a monopoly.  
In the post-conflict cases—East Timor, 
Bougainville, and Solomon Islands—other 
issues of order and security stemming from 
the conflict phase still give reason for 
concern, particularly in regard to relatively 
large numbers of weapons still present in 
the communities, armed groups that have 
not joined or have not remained in the 
respective peace processes, or groups in 
society that do not recognise the 
legitimacy of the governments. In these 
circumstances more demanding 
programmes of weapons disposal or 
disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration as well as security sector 
reform are a necessity. 
5.3 Social needs 
In all six countries, the delivery of basic 
social services ranks highest in the 
expectations of people towards the state; at 
the same time, in all the studies, 
government capacities are limited. The 
effectiveness of service delivery varies 
from place to place (with towns and areas 
close to urban centres better served than 
remote rural areas) and from country to 
country. Tonga is far ahead of the other 
countries with regard to human 
development indicators and access to 
services (but even in Tonga people 
perceive the government as insufficiently 
delivering key services in health, education 
and water). Public sector reform aimed at 
cost effectiveness through reduction of 
numbers of public servants has contributed 
to further weakening of service delivery in 
key sectors in Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
and Tonga. 
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In all countries the most fundamental and 
reliable social safety net is provided by kin 
groups, based on customary norms of 
reciprocity and sharing. This even applies 
to completely new circumstances, such as 
in the Tongan case where the Tongan 
diaspora extensively supports families and 
kin at home. Civil society institutions, 
most notably the churches, play an 
important role in service delivery 
everywhere, particularly with regard to 
health and education. The churches are 
generally very efficient in service delivery 
and are held in high esteem due to their 
positive role in communities. There is a 
wide spectrum of non-state actors 
engagement, ranging from Bougainville 
and East Timor, where almost all schools 
are run by the churches (with oversight and 
funding from the state), to Tonga where 
government runs nearly 90 percent of 
primary schools but only a third of 
secondary schools, with, again, the 
churches providing the rest. The Southern 
Highlands Province presents a special case 
as resource extraction companies are 
relatively efficient and successful in 
delivering social services in the vicinity of 
project sites. 
In Bougainville and Solomon Islands 
informal education institutions (custom 
schools) are in operation and they provide 
promising approaches to education that are 
more adapted to the specific conditions 
and needs of the respective societies than 
the education provided by the introduced 
systems. To take customary knowledge 
(especially with regard to health) seriously 
and to forge links between the formal 
system of health and education and 
customary institutions outside the formal 
system could improve the effectiveness of 
service delivery. In order to tap into the 
wealth of traditional knowledge and also to 
provide a way in which custom can reflect 
on itself across the country in question, it 
is important to have or to establish centres 
for the study of culture and custom. These 
centres could develop in ways that suit 
local circumstances—the Vanuatu Cultural 
Centre (VKS) in Port Vila (Vanuatu) 
provides a very effective example. 
5.4  Law and justice 
In all countries and regions analysed, law 
and justice are not exclusive realms of the 
state; rather, legal pluralism prevails, and 
customary law plays an active and 
relatively independent role in relation to a 
wide range of disputes and grievances 
(apart from Tonga, where customary law is 
formally integrated into state law). 
Customary law is strong in Bougainville, 
Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, it plays a 
significant role in East Timor, and 
although it is under pressure in the 
Southern Highlands Province it remains an 
important source of order there as well. In 
the eyes of people on the ground, 
customary law enjoys considerable 
legitimacy, it is perceived as providing 
solutions to many issues that are related to 
the maintenance of order and harmony in 
the communities and is widely seen as 
effective and just. This is not to imply that 
customary law is unproblematic. Research 
in Vanuatu, for example, shows people, 
particularly women and youth, have some 
complaints about biased outcomes and not 
having their views adequately heard or 
considered by local customary leaders, 
nevertheless, the majority still turn to 
customary authorities in preference to 
police and courts, due to accessibility, and 
greater familiarity with and understanding 
of local customary law and processes of 
conflict resolution (Rousseau 2003, 
Forsyth 2007). 
State law, by comparison, is often seen as 
alien, difficult to understand and costly to 
access. Fear of police using violence can 
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be another factor (particularly for women 
and youth). People often prefer some 
combination of statutory law and 
customary law. In Bougainville, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu there is a lot of debate 
on where and how to draw the line 
between the realm of customary law and 
state law, how to enhance the 
accountability and transparency of actors 
who apply customary law, whether or not 
to formalise customary law and whether or 
not to pay for the respective services of 
traditional authorities. In these countries 
state actors also widely acknowledge the 
importance of customary law.  
In East Timor the formal justice sector is 
extremely weak, while customary 
mechanisms can have difficulty dealing 
with crimes generated by the country’s 
transitional political dynamics. Regarding 
local problems, however, there is much 
greater consistency of justice, with the 
management of most crimes and disputes 
arbitrated by communities largely through 
customary authorities. 
Where customary law is strong it 
contributes considerably to the 
maintenance of order in local 
communities. It is important to try and 
integrate customary and state law and 
where there are incompatibilities (for 
example, in relation to universal concepts 
of human rights) to see these as challenges 
rather than insurmountable obstacles.  
The law enforcement agencies of the 
state—police, courts, correctional 
services—lack capacity, effectiveness and 
legitimacy in all cases (again, apart from 
Tonga). We found that the Southern 
Highlands Province and East Timor are 
experiencing the most critical gaps. The 
reality is that state institutions are unable 
to assert sovereign control over all territory 
which means that the police and judicial 
authorities possess a restricted reach and 
are of limited value for the maintenance of 
law and order on the ground. Customary 
institutions, where intact, are often more 
effective and legitimate. In many places in 
Vanuatu, Bougainville, East Timor, 
Solomons or Southern Highlands, for 
example, the police can function relatively 
effectively and legitimately only when 
working together with customary 
authorities like chiefs and elders. While it 
is important to improve the quality of the 
police, this should be done by focusing on 
collaboration with chiefs and other 
customary authorities. Concepts of 
community-based policing are moving in a 
more inclusive direction. 
The same holds true for the correctional 
services. Notions of indigenous restorative 
justice (rather than introduced Western 
concepts of punitive justice) are very 
important for many people in Pacific 
island countries. Rehabilitation of 
offenders in community contexts and 
utilisation of customary authorities as 
probation (and even correctional) officers 
might offer more positive solutions for 
administering justice than the construction 
of more prisons. State institutions could 
instead provide oversight, to ensure that 
principles of human rights and national 
law are preserved. 
Civil society organisations, in particular 
the churches and NGOs specialising in 
mediation and dispute resolution (for 
example the Peace Foundation Melanesia 
in Southern Highlands Province and 
Bougainville, or the Justice and Peace 
Commission in East Timor), play 
important complementary roles when it 
comes to rehabilitation and conflict 
prevention. They can complement efforts 
by state and customary institutions. 
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Organised crime in urban areas, large-scale 
resource related criminal projects and 
crime committed by actors and institutions 
from the state sphere itself (police, 
politicians, senior public servants) pose 
severe challenges to integrative, 
community-based approaches to law and 
justice. Even in some of these cases, 
however, customary mechanisms could 
still contribute. In Vanuatu, for instance, 
chiefs are working on mechanisms to 
address law and order issues in urban 
areas. 
5.5  Leadership and representation 
In all countries, apart from Tonga, there 
were different forms of leadership and 
representation in the state and customary 
spheres. In Tonga the monarch and the 
nobles monopolise state power, and these 
customary leaders are recognised within 
the state. This arrangement, however, is 
increasingly challenged by a democracy 
movement that demands changes to the 
undemocratic features of the Tongan state 
which drastically limit the representation 
of ‘commoners’. In the other cases, liberal 
democratic systems of leadership and 
representation are well established on 
paper. This, however, does not say much 
about the real processes of leadership 
selection and representation. Melanesian 
parliamentary systems often apply logic 
incompatible with liberal democratic 
principles (including the selection of 
leaders based on kin affiliations and 
patronage, accompanied by hand-out 
mentalities and necessitating significant 
corruption). Office holders in state 
institutions are often not held in high 
esteem by the people; complaints that 
Members of Parliament are remote from 
their constituencies are widespread in 
Solomon Islands, Bougainville and 
Vanuatu. Destructive, even violent, forms 
of competition between factional or party 
leaders in East Timor or in the Southern 
Highlands Province are major causes of 
instability and poor systems of 
governance. Customary leadership, on the 
other hand, despite sometimes being 
arbitrary, self serving or ignorant, is still 
generally effective and legitimate when it 
comes to governing the affairs of the 
everyday life in the local context. (In 
Tonga, local government at the village 
level is weak given the highly centralised 
nature of government structures).  
There is some doubt, however, whether 
customary effectiveness at village levels 
can be achieved at higher levels of 
governance. Capable local leaders often 
turn out to be incapable and corrupt at the 
national level. Some sectors of the 
population, mainly youth and women, have 
begun to question the usefulness of 
customary leadership. In general, however, 
the legitimacy of leadership is still much 
more based on traditional authority—and, 
to a certain extent, on charismatic authority 
(see for instance, commanders of armed 
groups in East Timor and Bougainville) — 
than on legal-rational authority in the 
context of state functions and positions. 
There is a real danger of competition 
between these different forms of 
leadership, but there are also chances for 
higher levels of complementarity. 
Attempts to identify the ‘real’ chiefs, for 
example, and to formalise their status and 
to clarify their roles in relation to state 
institutions are well underway in 
Bougainville, Vanuatu and Solomon 
Islands. Leaders who are capable of 
operating both in the customary as well as 
the state and the civil society realms would 
be the most effective.
7
   
                                                 
7 Geoffrey White points to the problematic aspects of 
formalizing the status of traditional leaders: 
“Incorporating traditional leaders in the framework of 
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In all cases, women and youth are under-
represented as leaders in the political and 
customary spheres. In Tonga the 
discrimination of women is even 
constitutionally fixed (as women can only 
stand for positions as people’s 
representatives in parliament). In 
Bougainville, on the other hand, women 
are provided with (limited) specific rights 
(three reserved seats for women in the 
House of Representatives). Civil society in 
all of these countries opens new avenues 
for female and young leaders. Church 
leaders generally enjoy high legitimacy. In 
all countries highly capable women leaders 
can be found; but generally they are more 
(Southern Highlands Province) or less 
(Bougainville) ignored and sidelined by 
male leaders. 
5.6  Participation and inclusion 
In all the studies conducted, there is a 
significant disconnection between national 
governments and communities which 
seriously weakens the potential for 
participation, representation and effective 
governance. All countries are post-
colonial, nominally liberal democracies 
(with the exception of Tonga, which never 
had been colonised and which is a 
constitutional monarchy with limited rights 
of participation for commoners). In reality, 
however, the liberal democratic norms, 
institutions and procedures are weakly 
                                                                          
government may have the effect of creating a new 
kind of leader who is more like a government official, 
based on appointment rather than personal reputation. 
Recent surveys about these issues show people 
making a distinction between ‘real’ traditional leaders 
and those whose status derives from appointment (…) 
On the one hand, there is widespread support for 
empowering traditional leaders so that they may be 
more effective in local governance. On the other 
hand, efforts to objectify the status of chiefs through 
appointments are sometimes seen as a departure from 
custom that may lead to lack of respect or abuse of 
power or both” (White 2006: 13). 
appreciated by many people on the ground 
and do not deliver effective democratic 
rule. We discovered some evidence to 
suggest that the exercise of democracy in 
some of these states might even contribute 
to their fragility since electoral processes 
sometimes divide formerly integrated 
communities. Elections can be times of 
heightened tensions and even violence (in 
East Timor and Southern Highlands 
Province in particular). Whereas in some 
cases elections are free and fair (for 
example in Bougainville and Vanuatu), in 
other cases they are plagued with extensive 
fraud and corruption (Southern Highlands 
Province). There are a number of 
dimensions of Western liberal democracy 
that sit uneasily with high context 
cultures—concepts of adversarial politics, 
open competition, party politics and the 
notion of a formalised opposition to name 
a few. These processes are open to 
corruption, patronage, clientelism and 
conflict generation rather than conflict 
prevention.  
Often democratic forms of government 
with competitive electoral processes have 
not generated higher levels of participation 
or inclusion, nor do they generate what we 
call “grounded legitimacy”. In places 
where local community life is still intact, 
customary forms of governance work 
relatively well and are seen as effective 
and legitimate (for example village 
assemblies in Bougainville).  This should 
not be taken to imply that custom is 
somehow qualitatively superior to liberal 
democracy, however, as it generates its 
own sets of problems and dilemmas.  
Women and youth, for example are 
generally excluded from many customary 
processes of decision-making. These and 
others divisions like the divide between 
nobles and commoners in Tonga generate 
their own discontents. The differentiation 
of participation and inclusion according to 
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categories such as age, gender and status is 
not acceptable from a liberal democratic 
point of view. Hence there are 
incompatibilities of liberal democratic and 
customary forms of participation.  
There are, however, also options for 
complementarity. The Bougainville 
Constitution, for example, includes direct 
democratic processes, such as a provision 
for the recall of members of parliament, 
which have their roots in the customary 
sphere. More broadly, customary 
governance is itself a form of local 
participation that could be drawn more 
comprehensively into national governance 
and judicial institutions. State-building that 
does not assist constructive linkage 
between state institutions and customary 
values and practices may not be supporting 
democracy. This is not to say that 
customary governance is egalitarian. 
However, it forms a widespread language 
of socio-political and ethical community 
that makes sense to people—to effectively 
exclude it is a form of disenfranchisement. 
The sense of frustration and 
disenchantment in East Timor, for 
example, is in part the result of the 
marginalisation and undermining of what 
are widespread social values and 
mechanisms for local administration in the 
space of the new state. 
The problem is not that customary and 
liberal democratic state forms of 
governance are irreconcilable; rather that 
there are destructive cycles of interaction 
between them which have developed over 
time. An example is the distorted electoral 
dynamics in Melanesia, caused in part by 
the incapacity of government to deliver 
services, in part by parliamentarians, 
unable to channel real services, viewing 
their roles in terms of patronage rather than 
wider concepts of public service, and in 
part by electorates seeing their vote as a 
route to patronage. In order to tackle these 
kinds of problems there is an urgent need 
for discussions about what kind of 
democracy best suits Pacific islands 
societies and cultures. Instead of insisting 
on building systems which look like 
replicas of Western liberal democracies, 
such discussions should  focus on home-
grown concepts of democratic governance 
that build on the consultative and inclusive 
strengths of the indigenous cultures rather 
than Western-style adversarial (party) 
politics. There are a number of actors who 
could begin focusing on some of these 
debates. Customary leaders should be 
included in discussions on these questions. 
This is to some extent already occurring in 
Vanuatu with members of the 
Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs 
taking an active part in current discussions 
on land and constitutional reform.   
Civil society groups (especially church 
leaders) and intellectuals can also play a 
critical role in focusing discussion on what 
sorts of democratic processes best suit 
specific societal contexts. These groups are 
also well placed to insist on higher levels 
of political accountability from both 
customary and elected political leaders and 
what might constitute ‘good enough 
governance’. Again this assertion is not 
meant to idealise any of these groups. 
There is evidence, for example, that some 
religious organisations in the Pacific are as 
non-transparent with parishioners’ funds as 
governments are with public funds. These 
groups, however, are often the ones that 
play critical connecting roles between 
government and customary authorities. 
Civil society groups in the countries 
included in this study are at very different 
stages of development. In Tonga, for 
example, civil society organisations have 
become quite strong in recent years, 
whereas in Bougainville or Solomon 
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Islands they are still rather weak. The civil 
society sphere, however, does provide 
women and youth, who often are excluded 
from meaningful participation both in the 
state sphere and the customary sphere, 
with new avenues for political 
participation. Civil society groups need to 
help women and youth connect to both 
state and customary spheres in innovative 
and generative ways.  
5.7  Identities and citizenship 
Tonga is the only country among the 
Pacific case studies where people exhibit a 
strong national identity as Tongans (even 
if many of them are living in the diaspora). 
‘The Tongan Way’ (Anga faka-Tonga), 
which is based on the convergence of 
selected customary and introduced values 
and a deep integration of Christian religion 
into state and society, serves as a unifying 
concept that forges a strong national and 
cultural identity. Melanesian countries 
have not yet developed concepts of 
national identity that are as strong as those 
established in Tonga.  
People in Melanesia generally have a weak 
identification with what it means to be a 
member of a ‘nation’ and a citizen of a 
state. However, they do strongly identify 
with what it means to be a member of a 
clan or village. Identities based on locality 
and/or kinship ties tend to be far more 
important than ‘national’ identities (Reilly 
2004). 
In the case of Bougainville, and even more 
so, East Timor, the wars against outside 
forces had unifying effects—the rising 
awareness of being ‘Bougainvillean’ or 
‘Timorese’ became important for the self-
perceptions of the people. This, however, 
has not led to the disappearance of internal 
divisions. Traditional dividing lines among 
the Bougainvillean populace continue to 
inform social relations and politics. In East 
Timor there are deep political fractures, 
and a painful debate is underway about 
who ‘won’ independence, who is part of 
the national community and who is not. 
Divisions amongst the leadership are 
caught in this debate; it also played a key 
role in the crisis of 2006 and the inter-
communal tensions between those from the 
east and from the west of the country. The 
case of East Timor shows that establishing 
‘national liberation’ as a basis for national 
identity and entitlement can be 
dangerously divisive, as East Timorese had 
different understandings of, and came to 
different terms with, the long Indonesian 
occupation. East Timor offers an example 
of state-building that has so far largely 
sidelined culture and customary 
governance. As a consequence, many 
people, particularly in rural areas, feel 
marginalised within their newly 
independent state while local sources of 
social cohesion are being weakened. A 
potential basis of citizenship is being 
ignored, contributing to feelings of 
frustration and confusion. 
Politics and identity in the Southern 
Highlands are very much based on clan 
affiliations, a ‘national’ Papua New 
Guinean identity is not widely held (even 
less so in Bougainville, which is formally 
still part of PNG). People in Vanuatu, and 
to a lesser degree the Solomon Islands, are 
in the difficult process of forging some 
kind of an inclusive, overarching identity 
by combining introduced notions of 
‘nation’ and ‘citizenship’ with customary 
self-perceptions as members of families, 
clans and islands. In Vanuatu in particular, 
‘kastom’ (the adaptation of customary 
norms and values to ever changing societal 
circumstances) is seen to serve as the 
binding force that a national identity could 
and should be built upon. As there are no 
prospects for ‘national identities’ to trump 
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or substitute for customary identities, and 
given the widespread significance of 
custom in people’s lives across the region, 
this indicates a possible direction for other 
countries as well. This means focusing 
attention on how to generate a citizenship 
that is grounded in, or at least engages 
with, customary identities, paying due 
attention to the relationships between kin, 
community and ‘nation’(-state). 
Appreciating the multiple nature of 
people’s identities allows for a more 
nuanced and creative approach to 
citizenship. This involves engaging with 
village and clan identities rather than 
rejecting them as sources of clientelism, 
parochialism and division. 
The churches and other civil society 
organisations often provide a different kind 
of space for people of different customary 
backgrounds to come together and 
discover an identity that transcends kin-
based relationships. Indigenised 
Christianity in particular is of profound 
significance “to virtually all Melanesians, 
for whom religion is not a 
compartmentalised set of beliefs and 
rituals but an intimate lived experience and 
a strategy mobilised pragmatically to 
achieve private and public ends” (Douglas 
2000: 6); indigenised Christianity is 
“arguably the key national and 
transnational symbol throughout 
Melanesia” (ibid.: 5). Building on these 
“superordinate” ideas of identity is critical 
to the development of an inclusive idea of 
citizenship. In general we discovered that 
the members of different types of civil 
society organisations had the most 
advanced understanding of nationhood and 
citizenship.  
It is very difficult—and probably 
undesirable—in any of the states in 
question to support the emergence of ideas 
of nationality and citizenship that 
undermine or diminish the identities, 
responsibilities and obligations of family, 
kin and clan. This means that there is a 
need to develop an approach to citizenship 
and the broader political community that 
recognises and harnesses these obligations. 
By affirming their centrality it may be 
possible to develop a more grounded basis 
for a citizenship which recognises not only 
individual but also collective rights. 
6. Conclusions 
In all Pacific countries comprehensive 
processes of state formation are underway. 
The direction, pace and driving factors of 
these transformations differ. Tonga with its 
constitutional monarchy, in which the 
customary and the state sphere are closely 
interwoven, is on the way to more liberal 
democratic forms of governance. This 
gradual process is driven by civil society 
forces that are growing in strength. 
Although it implies far-reaching political 
changes, it has so far not led to fragility 
(the riots in Nuku’alofa in November 2006 
seem more likely to be exceptional rather 
than the norm). 
Changes in the Tongan case point in the 
direction of ‘more liberal democracy and 
less customary governance’. Custom in 
Tonga is not only somewhat different than 
in the other cases (Polynesian rather than 
Melanesian or Austro-Malay), it also was 
formalised in the state according to a 
Victorian model of statehood. The other 
cases tell another story. In the Melanesian 
cases of Vanuatu, Bougainville and 
Solomon Islands the re-arrangement of the 
relations between the institutions of the 
state, the customary sphere and civil 
society is at the heart of transformations. 
Here negotiation of the conditions and 
possibilities of a ‘marriage’ between 
customary governance and introduced 
Western forms of governance is under 
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way, based on relatively strong customary 
spheres and state institutions that struggle 
with problems of effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Such a ‘marriage’ offers a path 
to greater connection between 
communities and governments in the 
Melanesian countries, and so promises to 
contribute to home-grown democratic 
practice. Although laden with risks and 
uncertainties, conditions in these countries 
should not be seen primarily through the 
‘fragile state’ lens, as they open avenues 
for the formation of new forms of resilient 
and legitimate governance.  
The situations in East Timor and the 
Southern Highlands Province are more 
difficult, albeit for different reasons. East 
Timor is currently engaged in a 
‘conventional’ state-building process (with 
massive external assistance), in the course 
of which a variety of serious problems 
have arisen that have to do with tensions 
within a ‘Western’ understanding of 
policies and the state. East Timor is an 
instructive example of the fact that 
“foreign pressure on weak states to build 
state capacity is part of the problem rather 
than the solution” (Tedesco 2008: 2-3). 
Other than in Tonga and similar to the 
Melanesian cases, a deeper involvement of 
customary institutions—which still exist 
and are strong at the local level, but have 
been marginalised in the current state-
building endeavour—could contribute to 
overcoming the current problems of 
Timorese state formation. In the Southern 
Highlands Province of PNG customary 
institutions have been considerably 
weakened and state institutions also are 
weak. There is a void of effective and 
legitimate governance (to a certain extent 
filled by the churches and other civil 
society organisations), and future prospects 
are unclear. 
The label of ‘fragile state’ does not bring 
analytical clarity to any of the cases. We 
should not see these countries and regions 
(or developing countries in general) simply 
as deviations from the OECD model, 
rather they should be assessed in their own 
right, according to a spectrum of possible 
strengths and weaknesses. It is more 
appropriate to talk about ‘states emerging 
from hybrid political orders’ as a common 
denominator, in line with the hypothesis 
that provided the starting point of our 
research. We have come to this conclusion 
by widening the scope of analysis, not only 
looking at the institutions of the state, but 
also taking into account the customary 
sphere and civil society, and rather than 
solely focusing on effectiveness of state 
institutions, looking also at issues of 
legitimacy and citizenship/identity. 
We found considerable (potential for) 
complementarity of state and non-state 
actors in the provision of functions that in 
the OECD countries belong to the realm of 
the state. Law and order, for instance, are 
not only provided by the police and the 
judiciary, but also by chiefs and customary 
law. In contrast to our original 
assumptions, we found hardly any cases of 
substitution, that is, cases where non-state 
actors entirely take on state functions (or 
vice versa); rather, complementarity is the 
rule. Moreover, customary actors often 
sought complementarity—that is, they 
sought to adapt to and work with state 
bodies. An obstacle to more effective 
complementarity in many cases was a lack 
of organisations or opportunities that 
brought relevant state and customary 
actors together, that supported sharing of 
information, mutual familiarity and 
problem-solving.  
We found certain incompatibilities of state 
and customary institutions, for instance 
with regard to issues of participation and 
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inclusion (limited options for women and 
youth in specific customary contexts) or 
with regard to leadership and 
representation (traditional authority versus 
legal-rational authority). However, our 
impression (which needs confirmation 
through more thorough research) is that 
these are not due to insurmountable 
contradictions between customary and 
liberal democratic principles of 
governance, but can be overcome by 
processes of mutual adaptation and more 
evolved forms of articulation. Questions of 
electoral dynamics and representation, for 
example, are complex and difficult, but 
they are not ‘hopeless.’ Conflict is also 
evident in the economic sphere between 
commercial market and customary 
approaches, especially to land. This is an 
area of past and potential serious friction. 
Again, while possible to manage, this 
interface requires great care and 
commitment, and the reduction of 
ambiguous regulatory environments. 
These findings—large areas of 
complementarity, no substitution, limited 
but surmountable incompatibilities—augur 
well for mutual positive accommodation 
and constructive interaction of institutions 
from the realms of the state and custom. 
Any attempts at state-building that ignore 
or fight hybridity will have considerable 
difficulty in generating effective and 
legitimate outcomes. Strengthening central 
state institutions is unquestionably 
important, but if this becomes the main or 
only focus it threatens to further alienate 
local societies by rendering them passive, 
thereby weakening both a sense of local 
responsibility for overcoming problems 
and local ownership of solutions (Temby 
2007: 38).  
Recognising hybridity of political order 
therefore should be the starting point for 
any endeavours that aim at supporting state 
formation. This means acknowledging the 
capacities and legitimacy of non-state 
providers of security and other public 
goods and to integrate them into processes 
of building political order. Instead of 
taking for granted that the imposition of 
Western state systems is the most 
appropriate avenue for conflict prevention, 
peacebuilding and development, we posit 
that there are hybrid models which are 
more likely to deliver effective and 
legitimate governance and—as an effect of 
this—security and development. This 
means that it is possible to search for ways 
and means of ‘indigenising’ the institutions 
of the emerging state, of generating 
positive mutual accommodation of state 
and customary non-state as well as civil 
society mechanisms and institutions, which 
are not isolated domains on the ground, but 
elements of a particular ‘messy’ local 
socio-political context. The OECD 
‘Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations’ acknowledge this to a point 
when they note that it is important to 
“align with local priorities in different 
ways in different contexts” and “to identify 
functioning systems within existing local 
institutions, and work to strengthen these” 
(OECD-DAC 2007:3, principle 7). 
Taking the OECD Principles further, it is 
important to stress positive potential rather 
than negative features of so-called fragile 
states—de-emphasising weakness, fragility 
and failure, and focusing on hybridity, 
generative processes, resilience, innovative 
adaptation and ingenuity. This also entails 
perceiving community resilience and 
customary institutions not so much as 
‘spoilers’ and problems, but as assets and 
sources of solutions that can be drawn 
upon in order to forge constructive 
relationships between communities and 
governments, between customary and 
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introduced political and social institutions 
—“taking the local seriously” (White 
2006: 7). An approach to state-building 
that takes into account and supports the 
constructive potential of local community, 
including customary mechanisms where 
relevant, is a necessary complement to 
strengthening central state functions. For 
example, instead of perceiving kinship-
based societal formations merely as 
sources of corruption and nepotism and 
hindrances to accountability and 
transparency, they can also be considered 
as valuable social support networks which 
have their own checks and balances and 
mechanisms of accountability. 
Accordingly, through engagement and 
mobilisation of these networks, they can 
positively contribute to political order. 
For external actors committed to support 
processes of state formation it is of the 
utmost importance to establish ongoing 
dialogue with organisations and key 
individuals that are playing or can play 
‘bridging’ roles between the realms of 
state, custom and civil society. These 
actors will need comprehensive and 
specifically targeted assistance. A great 
advantage of small states like the Pacific 
island countries is that regular face to face 
discussions with most (if not all) of the 
relevant actors is often feasible. ‘Bridging’ 
institutions and personalities can make a 
direct impact in small states, and there is 
more scope for the meaningful inclusion of 
the ‘ordinary citizens’ in discussion about 
the directions of change for the polity in 
far more direct ways than in the much 
bigger OECD states. It is possible to 
anticipate a very widely inclusive 
participatory process of negotiation about 
the foundations and directions of political 
order which allows for the gradual 
development of a notion of citizenship. 
The debate on constitutional reform which 
is due or which is being conducted already, 
in some of these countries could serve as a 
focal point of such negotiation. ‘State-
building’ framed in this way would allow 
for much more meaningful ownership on 
the part of the people than an endeavour 
that is confined to building the capacities 
of the machinery of government. 
Such an approach takes the ‘subjective 
factors’ of state formation into account. 
State stability depends not only on 
capacities and effectiveness, but also on 
the (evolving) expectations and attitudes of 
the ‘citizens’. These ‘subjective factors’ 
are as important as the ‘objective’ factors 
of capacities and effectiveness. The 
relative illegitimacy of state institutions 
(and the high legitimacy of non-state 
institutions) poses a profound problem for 
state stability. The emergence of grounded 
legitimacy and the consequent 
development of a sense of citizenship are 
decisive dimensions for state formation. 
State institutions can only be legitimate if 
they satisfy the basic needs of the people, 
follow generally accepted procedural rules 
of governance and are grounded in an 
explicit or implicit compact between the 
state and the diverse communities upon 
which it is constituted.
8
 
With the exception of Tonga, we 
discovered considerable friction between 
people’s customary identity as members of 
traditional communities and their identity 
as citizens of modern (‘nation’-) states. 
This is a challenging area for policy 
makers.  Engagement with, not rejection 
of, customary community-based identities 
can be a beneficial part of citizenship 
formation in the Pacific and East Timor. 
                                                 
8 Lack of legitimacy is not only a problem for Pacific 
islands governments. Dillon and Westbury 
convincingly argue that “the legitimacy gap facing 
governments in remote Australia is real, and is 
increasing” (Dillon and Westbury 2007: 45). 
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Building citizenship has so far received 
much less support than building central 
government institutions. This is a major 
shortcoming as the main problem is not the 
fragility of state institutions as such, but 
the lack of closely knit constructive 
linkages between the institutions of the 
state and society. It is the problem of the 
persistent disconnect between communities 
and state institutions, the friction between 
liberal modes of governance and local 
practice, and hence the problem of 
legitimacy and citizenship. At the end of 
the day, the extent to which a state is 
rooted in society is critical for its strength, 
effectiveness and legitimacy. Therefore 
engaging with communities and non-state 
customary institutions is just as important 
as working with central state institutions 
and governments. “Focusing on the 
institutions of centralised government 
misses the importance of existing cultural 
resources and risks reproducing problems 
that contributed to past conflicts” (White 
2006: 14). Of course, there can be tension 
between encouraging local governance on 
the one hand and building central 
institutions of the state on the other; strong 
communities might lack the incentives to 
support central state institutions. The 
challenge is to find appropriate forms of 
constructive interaction. 
The best outcome of such a novel approach 
to building state and citizenship would be 
that new forms of governance emerge: 
combining state institutions, customary 
institutions and new elements of 
citizenship and civil society in networks of 
resilient governance which are not 
introduced from the outside, but are 
embedded in the societal structures on the 
ground. 
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